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much * part of the world of twentieth-eentury man. At the
**a* time

thero 1* th* «w«r»ties» that tte* actions of men

way of life. The resolution of thie conflict 1* so slraple
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Since hope is a concept that is future oriented in a
positive sense, the quest for human hope is a timely
endeavour in the world of man. Although hope is not a new
idea and it is not uncommon to hear people express hope in
their conversations, there remain ©any for whom the reality
of hope ©ay constitute a new experience. A better under*
standing of the meaning of hope may lead to greater opportunities for experiencing hope.
It is my preference to forego the task of providing
a preliminary definition of hope.

It would be inappropriate

and unfair to the reader if a definition of hope was pro*
vided at this point. Mo simple or single definition could
adequately encompass the range of meanings that arise in the
present analysis of different contexts and varied levels of
abstraction.

Furthermore, an initial definition might only

curtail the reader's involvement and the development of his
own understanding of hope as he reads what follows, evaluates it, and relates it to his own experience.
It will be helpful, however, to depict the general
areas to be considered in the present analysis of hope.
Some of the perspectives of the historical treatment of hope
are especially relevant to an adequate formulation of hu»an
hope, and will provide at starting point for this paper*
These perspectives will emphasize man's appreciation or non*
appreciation of hope &n& the reasons he has offered for
these viewpoints. This will be followed by a presentation
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of ideas about hope in theological and other contemporary
contexts*
There is an obvious distinction between these con*
ceptunl perspectives and the phenomenon of nope as an indi*
vidual experiences it or is thought to experience it. The
latter part of this paper will attend primarily to what is
known about the meaning of hope in phenomenalogical teras.
The present formulation of hope may thus be under*
stood to encompass (a) a picture of the content of hope and
its conceptual application in historical and contemporary
milieux, and (b) the phenomenon or experience of hope.

This

breakdown is intended to emphasise the important point that
ideas about the content and concept of hope do not necessarily describe the personal experience of hope. The present
analysis will attend to each of these aspects of hope.
is appropriately entitled "Hopes

It

A General Meaning Analy*

sis«w
The question of the relationship of human hopes and
human deeds is especially intriguing in itself.

I have

already pointed to the observation that hunan hopes and
human actions are often conflicting, but this relationship
is obviously aore complex.' The ambiguity surrounding this
relationship is particularly interesting since the future of
mankind ultimately depends on both his hopes and his
actions, not as they conflict, but as each supports the
other.

This issue will be treated as a sub-theae.

Some Perceptions of the Value of Hope
A sampling of our literary heritage suggests that
hope and hoping have been issues of concern to writers from
aany literary eras.

The perspectives that arise in this

cursory review point to an awareness of the reality of huoan
hope, a reality that is viewed as having questionable »@rlts«
Specifically, there is a great deal of ambivalence associated with the value of human hope and hoping.

The following

review exemplifies this issue.
Virtually all early Greek writers provided a concept
of hope that reflected a prevailing philosophy of life.

The

nature of elois, the Greek word for hope, was generally a
result of the perspective the Greeks held toward life and
religion. Nevertheless, the early Greek writers expressed
different opinions regarding the value of hop© and hoping.
This was a reflection of changes in life philosophy and cer*
tain individual impressions of hope {Williams, 1927).
The elpis of Greek literature was etymoiogically
connected with voluntas. the Latin word for pleasure, and
hope had the meaning of a pleasurable affective state. However, this meaning was not evident in the early writings of
Homer and Pindar where hoping was understood only in the
loose sense of 'expect* or 'suppose.' This latter meaning
was short-lived and replaced by *to desire confidently,
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s
often at one's awn cost.*

These different meanings can be

understood in the context of Greek religious beliefs In
early times (tfilliaa*, 1927),
Olympian theolog/ SKphasized the superiority of the
fteltia* #vtr n®rtal*» tholx capacity far Jaalaiisy and envy*
And their vengeful actions directed at ©en. Punishment by
the Gads was attributed to either the strivings of man to
liken thaautalvoa to tha Oada by attaining material prospar*
ityf or tfeo iasalafta* #nd tin that aeeanpanied prosperity.
As usatarlnl fains aceruad aon war* provided tha hop* of fur*
tha* awe«#saas only t* ha thwarted by tha vonfoful actions
©f tha God**
It was this frustration of ft***** hapaa that provided
hope with a some-vlu t sinister meaning and lad Hesiod to
writ* of it m an ovil that hal«mt*d to tha mm

claas of

event* a* death ana diseases that cause havoc among mankind.
Thi* viewpoint waa avldaiiaed In tha writing* of Mamert
Theognis, Pindar, Bacchylides, Herodutus, and Prometheus,
and clearly aiepra&aad by Aeschylus in tha Agamemnon:
Tha great gad* hoard our cause, and in ana mood
ising, in tha wm of bitter blood,
t
san should shriek and dla and toners should burn,
ffi
Cast thair fraat vatai wbil* aver t&ersy** urn
Hap* waved her empty hand** and nothing fall

tin William** p. 2133.
At tha same time not all writers war* blind to tha possibility of a favourable hope. Theognis stated in hi* elegies:
El pis is tha only food dalty laft to saaas tha
others have forsaken them, and fan* to Olympus.
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Faith, Teaiperance, have gone. The graces have left
the earth. No longer are just oaths observed among
taen, nor does anyone reverence the imiaortal gods.
. . . But as long as man lives and beholds the light
of the sun, let him worship the gods and wait upon
Hope. Let him pray to the gods, and, as he burns
goodly thighs, let him sacrifice first m& last to
Hope [in Williams, pp. 209-210].
Sophocles also acknowledged a good hope, but recognized a
danger in the activity of hoping;
For that far-roving Hope, though many men have comfort of her, to many is a Delusion that wings the
dreams of Desire: and he whoa she haunts knows
nothing till he burn his foot against hot fire [in
Williams, p. 213}.
This passage indicates that Sophocles saw hope as a source
of gratification, but also saw the element of delusion in
hope, leading saan away froa reality and resulting in his
disappointment and destruction.
The writings of Euripides and Thucydides brought the
awareness of a transition in religious outlook and the
beginning of a change in the outlook on hope. This change
continued under the influence ©f Orphisit and the spread of
the Oionysiac and Pythagorean cults in the next century.
These religious movements held that God was a deified man,
and with this breakdown in the barrier between deity and
men, elpis was no longer viewed as a curse to human strivings.

Plato and Socrates emphasized the divine origin ©f

the soul and the belief that roan was good by nature*

With

their view of a good God and a generally optimistic view of
life there was a favourable use of the word hope. This view
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of hope evolved further in the writings of St. Paul.

In

Pauline theosophy the Christian was considered a child of
God, and was expected to look forward to eternal happiness.
He had every reason to hope (Williams, 1927).
The poetry of wore recent times shows the persistence of a favourable orientation toward hope and hoping.
Samuel Johnson stated:

"where there is no hope there can be

no endeavor [in Menninger, 1959, p. 483 j.w Emerson wrote:
"it is by hope that we judge a man's wisdom [in Menninger,
p. 483]"} Bliss Carmen:

u

An open hand, an easy shoe, And a

hope to make the day go through [in Bartiett, 1953, p. 63]B ;
Robert Bridges:

M

i live on hope ^nd that 1 think do all who

come into this world [in Bartiett, p. 37 j M ; William Shakespeare:

"True hope is swift, and flies with swallow's

wings; Kings it makes Gods, and meaner creatures kings [in
Bartiett, p. 346J."
Others have maintained the pessimistic position held
by the early Greeks.

For example, Shelley wrote:

"Worse

than despair, worse than the bitterness of death is hope [in
Menninger, p. 483] w ; and Nietzsche:

w

Hope is the worst of

evils, for it prolongs the torment ©f man [in Menninger,
p. 483]."
The pessimism surrounding the idea of hope ©ay be
given several interpretations according to the different
contexts in which hope has been considered.

The early Greek

conception of hope as a state of negative affairs can be
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attributed to their fatalism regarding the course of life
events (Menninger, 1959).

Man's lot was determined accord-

ing to the whims of a deity who consciously and successfully
opposed the actions and desires of men. There was a prevalent feeling that all events were predetermined by the deity
and, should man hope, he had no reason to expect to see his
hope fulfilled.

According to Metz (1963) the world of the

Greeks appeared as a consistent ^nd closed cosmos.
The more recent pessimism concerning hope seems to
be associated with a more complex attitudinal configuration.
It is linked to two profound questions raised by secular
existentialists:

"Can there be a moral order for man of the

twentieth century?*1 and from this "Can human existence be
meaningful?"

Precipitated in part by the intellectual

awareness that God might be merely a projection of man,s
mind, the thought quickly followed that without a God there
could be no right or wrong, there could be no moral process
with which man could identify and upon which he could base
his life activity*

The question was:

moral order without God?M

"Could there be a

We can imagine the pain and suf-

fering of those who, steadfast in their belief in a God,
were forced to examine this possibility*

in a world where

there was no reality of good or evil, where there was no
reason to value one event over another, it was thought that
there could be no reason to hope (Evans, 1971),

Hope was
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considered an alien in a world without morality, a world
where all was permitted to man.
The question of a moral reality was intimately tied
to the issue of meaning in the lives of men.

If there was

no reason for morality and all things were perceived as
having equal or neutral value, then life presented itself as
nothing more than a series of meaningless events. From this
perspective, man*s ability to make choices was seen as irrelevant*

And, as hope expressed a conscious tendency toward

a particular state of affairs, it was considered an absurdity in a world of total and encompassing meaninglessness
(Evans, 1971).
It is important to recognize that the intellectual
perspective that denies morality, meaning, and the value of
hope is not, in itself, sufficient grounds to deny the
experience of hope. One cannot assume that individual
preferences die even in a world which is 'thought* to be
meaningless.

As long as one desires a particular state of

affairs, he may have grounds for hoping that the state of
affairs will be realized.

Even those who accept the intel-

lectual denial of meaning may have desires for a different
and meaningful life and experience this hope.
Although the fatalism of the Greeks and the despair
over morality and meaning in the twentieth century are not
sufficient grounds to deny the experience of hope, both
attltudinal frameworks deny the value in hope.

It is both
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necessary and helpful to question whether those who depreciated existence first experienced it as meaningless, or on
the basis of the idea that life is meaningless, then found
it so, T© some extent the idea that life was meaningless
may have precluded the possibility of finding or being
receptive to meanings.

In this sense, an attitude of mean-

inglessness is distinguished by its functional impoverishment.
This issue is particularly significant in the present context since it points to the realization that attitudes toward life may curtail thoughts about hope, and may
even preclude the experience of hope. This issue is
extremely relevant to the life of twentieth-century man
whose exposure to existential pessimism would seem to have
been both intensive and extensive. The essence of this
point of view was aptly expressed in Romans IV. 18. s *»flho
against hope believed in hope?** ^ e may take this a step ^

*" {r*£*

further and ask Mlfi?ho against hope experienced hope?**
Even though there are sufficient reasons to take the
idea of hope seriously and attempt to understand its meaning
more fully, we may expect that there will always be those
who either deny the value of hope or describe hope as a projection or a fabrication of man's mind, and relegate it to
the category of an 'opiate of the people.*

In response to

those who do see hope this way, it is only necessary to
point out that many value hope as a phenomenal reality and,
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for this reason, it warrants our attention and understanding.
It is obvious, as well, that hope is surviving the
attack that negates its value.

It may even be the case that

contemporary concern for hope has been fostered by its
previous depreciation.

There are those who see hope or

would like to see it in the world, those who believe in
hope, and those who have experienced hope.

It is the

author's feeling that hope is a positive reality.

The fol-

lowing section acknowledges this reality and describes one
context in v>/hieh contemporary man is describing a role for
hope.

Selected Aspects of a Theology of Hope
Man's hopes burst open his present, connect
him with his past, drive him toward the horizons of
a yet unrealized future [Braaten, 1968, p. 97j.
The hope school

of thought has bmn

organized by those

theologians who have looked beyond dogmatic constraints in
an attempt to clarify man's existential position and his
potential for becoming other than what he has bmen in the
past.

This represents a radical departure from some forms

of traditional theology and a movement toward an alternate,
more accurate, and more complete picture of the human being
as an 'eschatological being'—one who is future oriented.
Hope theologians do not discard the past and present in
favour of the future.

Importance is placed on the future as

it relates to the past and present.

It is the synthetic

conception of these temporalities that marks the activity of
the hope school as a significant movement.
The theology of hope is grounded in the recognition
that change is the substratum of all human experience,
"More radically than earlier generations we know that we
live in history where everything changes and nothing remains
in its place [Moltman, 1970, p. 102].w

In like manner,

The author recognises that there are many different
theological perspectives on hope, and further, there may be
more than one 'hope school.* The present analysis, however,
is limited to aspects of the hope school of theology that
has been described in Capps (1970) and in Marty and Peerraan
(1968).
12
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aioch (1970) paint* out that reality 1* a category which is
exposed ta flexibility and obligated to change. This view
was expressed differently by Lawler (1963):

M

The only abso-

lute truth 1* that there la no absolute truth . . . [p. 183]. M

earlier theological thought. This orientation may have many
positive implications far a mm theology and tha practice of
* flaw religion.

on It In some theological circles seems to have evolved fro*a
tha ground lovel of experience, that 1* froai man's experience of himself and others &® tha real world.

The hope

theology is distinguished by tha fact that It focuses an man
in relation to hi* worldly future, rather than mm striving

far ath*r^«irJ414ii»«#. Novak fltaf) paint* out tha thaalagy
of hope 4* growing out of man's experience in tha world,
that 1* hi* experience of change.
Tha historical dialogue between Marxists and Chrisa^avaoiPwMa'

^•^^MM-nRjpp^ite'iwas w w w

mt9*mmf

^p<o)i*sp'aa'aF~apafi*a»'fliB***

*>^a&aiRas#

,

^a

mtmm^^mFWm^^jKx

'ipyaaBt »*

B^^W,^*^B^B-

It* activity on dogma to mm concerned with the dynamics of

organized Christian religion as the consolation and justification of tha status quo:
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Religion is the illusory realisation of man's
essence because man's essence possesses no genuine
reality . . . . Religious suffering is at once an
expression of man's real suffering and a protest
against that suffering, but it is the latter only in
the same way that the Chinese coolie reaches for his
opium pipe, it is the opium of the people [in
Calian, 1969, p. 434].
Marx recognized Christian dependency on a creator
and that Christian hope was contingent on the belief of a
promised and better life to be provided by the Deity. Marx
viewed this form of dependence as antithetical to full human
development and autonomy.
ence was other-worldly.

The Christian form of transcend-

He proclaimed a new heaven, but

forgot about a new earth.

In contrast, the Marxist longed

for the humanisation of man by man and not through idle worship in a God who may or may not exist. While the Christian
was content to hope through his beliefs, the Marxist looked
to a worldly future and placed his hope in man (Calian,
1969).
Theologians of the hope school work with tha awareness that other-woridliness has b@m an obstacle to human
progress, that the perpetuation of the heaven syndrome has
served to keep men poor by reconciling them to their earthly
poverty.

In part, this awareness seems to have grown out of

a closer identification of Marxist and Christian goals and
the realization that secular man is now more unwilling to be
inserted into a framework that is other-worldly.

Marxists

and some Christians agree that restriction of salvation to
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the grave beyond implies the obviation of human hope. With
the diminished importance of vertical transcendence and
dependence on absolute theologisms, it becomes less possible
to subordinate this world to some more permanent and more
valued domain (Capps, 1970).

This world no longer depends

on another for its reality and significance, it depends on
man.
On this basis, the hope school determines to:
. . . reduce the transcendent hopes of Christianity
in order to bring them into life and an active
alteration of the worldt it is able to stimulate
that aspect of hope in Christ which is concerned
with the changing of this world* The Christian hope
for the justice and kingdom of God in Christ must
enter into partnership with those who work for the
economic relief of the "heavy laden," m4 who work
politically for the freedom and dignity of man
[Braaten, 1968, p. 107].
The theology associated with the school of hope attests t© a
reality of objectively real possibility, and is directly
oriented toward realizing possibilities that would benefit
man.

Among the hope theologians there is widespread accept-

ance of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach:

"The philoso-

phers have merely interpreted the world in different ways?
now, however, it is a matter of changing it [in Bloch, 1970,
p. 61]."
The recent and growing awareness that men have tha
capacity to influence the direction of the evolutionary process has led some hope theologians to posit a theology by
design rather than by reaction to a given state of cultural
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affairs.

The hope school favours a stance where theoretical

categories are to be supplanted by actional ones.

The rela-

tionship to the future is viewed as operative, that is man
will have access to the future he wants only through creative action (Capps, 1970),
Hope theology argues that the novum cannot be
reduced to a component within an already existing system.
The future cannot be registered within schemas that are
devised for what is. Theory cannot account for the future,
nor can any interpretative explanatory conceptual scheme
adequately take note of it*

The theological form of coher-

ence in the past cannot represent that which is not-yetexistent.

In hope theology the contemplation of 'what is'

is replaced by 'what ought to be,' and the emphasis is on
'what form change shall take' rather than on the 'why' of
past or existent states of affairs. Man is no longer
exclusively concerned with 'what was,' but with a reality
that has 'not yet been,' a reality that will come into being
as a result of man's activity (Capps, 1970).
The hope school is not concerned with restoration or
with what has b®@n lost, but with the establishment of a
reality that has not yet been. Moltmann (1969) points out
that in the past "Christian faith was proclaimed not as
exodus out of the bondage of the past and through the boundaries of the present into the freedom of a new future, but
as a turning back to sacred sources [p. 104]."

History or
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the past ways of life were viewed as paradise lost, and salvation meant that paradise was regained.

In this frameworks

hoping was equivalent to the mythical faith of remembering.
Both the myth of eternal return and the hope for the return
to the primordial state of man are still evidenced in contemporary contexts.

In contrast to those who seek their

futures In the past, hope theology turns to the reality of
the yet unknown, and attempts to create in that unknown the
possibility of a better future.

The real contemplation of

the novum replaces a turning to the past, and a new dimension of experience is recognized in which features of existence that had not been looked at before become prominent.
With the recognition that there are no adequate prototypes
for such a future,roanbecomes the agent who will create and
control history.
We have seen that the theology of hope is designed
to activate movement and energy in the present, W© may wall
ask what other functions will the 'to do* theology take upon
Itself.

Theologians are aware of this question and point

out that the task of hope theology is to determine anew the
relationship between religion &n4 society, between the
church :&nd social publicness, and between eschatological
faith and life in society (Metz* 1970).

Hope theology sug-

gests the growing awareness that the development of human
beings is intimately entangled in the vicissitudes of society, and theology must now interpret and understand

1®
existence as a social-political problem In its broadest
sense. The theology of tha hope school will ha concerned
with important issues la the lives of secular mm*

There la

hope that relates Christians to a worldly future.
••asa
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social theology. Some hapa theologians have interpreted tha

withdrawal from society.
The importance and the m i l stent emphasis of modern
theology am tha subjectivity of tha believer, on hit
aaad to toy a posooaftl *Vo»* t® a*lw«tl*f*i k n w o M
t w » tolvfttio* lata a pidvata faaiity» and iftlo
tfeift tXOJWfOMMftltA Of OOlVOti** lata « p»i¥«ta »at*
ter throuoh transcendental* oersonalistic or axistoMiftl f«ot*t*« «tt»t ho awoxooao thratifh tha wodt*
ing out at a theology which we nave casr^ctorIzed
with tha phmm
*p«IItia«l» ihaalaw fttota, Xfii*
Hope theology repudiates the benefits of tha privatization of religion, and true salvation la associated with
^gf ww*w*aw"^Ms»0i»^^w

aa^Wtwjvaviav^in ^a»?flpHo^ok^Paisio?w^oyapoww

expressed by Garaudy (1968):

a* a^Mh^P:

ojwpsias^p

if^iFJflfca*asp

w^ai

^*^ikaisaa

jwp^w

"The future of mankind cannot

even without them . . . [p. 212]."

Christian hop* la no

ual, but that #f tha covenant, of tha peopie, ©f the many.
tha church of tha theology of hope la viewed as a
place where everysaan may articulate his hopes.
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. . . the church will provide * . . the occasion and
the place for vision, imagination* fantasy, and
Utopian thought. It should be a place in which one
can really imagine the kind of society, city, university, family, or a world quite different from the
way it is now [Cox, 1970, p. 135].
As Capps (1970) points out, the hope theology recommends a
movement from logos to mythos. This is similar to Bloch's
(1970) notion that the future is accessible through daydreaming and imagining, that is through activities which
have always been a part of the mythological approach.

As

myths are elements in which the future can be represented,
the mythologizing of the hope school will take the form of
pro-mythology which is creative and pushes ahead to include
the novum.
The church will also provide a basis for criticism
and reform in the present.

The future is conceived not only

in terms of projection, but also in the context of present
sufferings. Through the awareness and experience of present
miseries &n4 the criticism of the conditions that support
these miseries, man engages in the process of seeking a better future.

Christian messianism gives the church a criti-

cal perspective and loads it with the potential to act and
change present suffering.

Novak (1968) describes the role

of the church as that of being able to question on the basis
of a projected future?
. . . a merely projected future is limited and does
not represent the complete realization of historical
possibility. Man is gifted with an imagination and
a skeptical attitude which makes it possible for him

tQ

AUottL**1* conditions of tha future, to change tha
w
wi^rld.
"Cfflfm#ifflBatttly»
the
hwaa
aniswil
w?m® MM OM» empirical projections; hatra®ad#nda*
c a l l s than
l a t a question [ p . 2GSj.
Tha power of tha past that addresses the present
from the position of burdensome authority l a broken fey hope
t h a t 4mtm tha future Into tha sufferings of tha present.
Freedom from tha past does not mean t h a t the past l a fan*
gotten.

Ths past leads to the future and tha appropriation

of fcopofftil tontfoaelo* fso* tha paot fcolp* t o tfoftea f«&«*•
aai9t4tt$t#

Sitwia tha oatofoxy #€ *what ovo£t to ha» sveotvoo
special emphasis l a hope theology, I t would seem that tha
oeaning of hope cm ha related t o issues of morality.
Through the processes of c r i t i c i z i n g the present and Imagining future content mm «*y involve himself in aoral decisionmaking fry which certain end-states and actions t o a t t a i n
thaaa o«oVot«too xooofcro aoErol J»atif i a a t l a n .

Hiatal«**• i t

may be aaid t h a t the hopes af m a or, more praeisaly, tha
content a t hope can ha a reflection of man's moral decisions.
i t wamld h® inftot«oot f

JM»JOV«99

t o aaa a l l feapaa tfcio way*

Ao R*n haa tha capacity to saake moral decisions &nd act upon
theee, likewise ha haa the capacity to be amoral, immoral,
w&fm&imm
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actions ta attain that content are not always based on moral
decisions. However, to the extent that man's hopes are
based an tha crlticisa of existing atataa #f affair* and tha
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identification of 'what ought t o be' or a taorally desirable
at a^asaso)****•?jp

w^ap*

i f ^aaaMw^a™
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a w w w w
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understood a* a process that leads to hope. This suggests
that hope say occur as a function of man's ability to itiake

tion for aoral decislon-saaking.
fha importance placed on the concept of futurity and
'what aught to ha* goes hand-In-hand with a aotflflostto* la

gxoto* 1* tiwt livoo of froUoaanm (ftoaaxt* 1*4S)* «Mt that It
—wipw

afo# sp^waa

° f * w wiw»«aa*p*w» "WFIUHUS

{Lo*io*# 1968).
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The new Goo app*«r$ a t the po,/er of tha

ftttonro t o eautswdtef tha *ogoti¥0 aoMMtta of oxlotoaoo t h a t
we mm- experience,

fha divinity a t ©ad l a seen m m dynam-

i s e a t t h a future brntrnm f»an and not above hiw, Tha subordinates I n the previous God-world polarity ar# reversed, and
transcendence I s j^&ninafullv related t o the r e a l i t i e s of
t i n a and change*
Reality l a now **eo t o include t h a t «hich haa notyet-coae-into-belng and aust ha realized.
ws*aso

^ w s B i ^ a ^ * ap^pR™?1 %
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Understood as God
TiFSpp«fflNBFWs ^P" m

m& a ^
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wise am hlaaali. Sad becomes the one who© mm will be
(Capps, 1970).

hloch (1970) suggests that tha concept of

becoming la in itself hope, and the process of becoming is
hope fulfilled. Man la the focal point of hope In the
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present and tha culaination of U f a in tha future. The

himself a* ha mediates, directs, and effects the course of

future and tha mmm

by which tha future will be realized.

Tha saspi'wisis on chang# 1 A tha position artlculatad

paint* f ixott It wanid a**® that thmmm* 1* Itaalf * to not
necessarily advantageous &nd, on mmm occasions, It i»y be

mmmhmlMm ** **• mmmt that kmp% la aalipaad* te^t 1®
iayoxtoAt* ho*o***v i««* tha point of *lo» that *** la a M a
t® ooloet a daslimhle fwtww out «f tho iApradiaata of
^hanga and act to bring ahaurt that f«t^ra« 1* this wayt
man's hapaa can mmm

a regulative function, inasmuch at

they give direction to tha course at chaise mid tha actions
Of *•**
Tha theology at hops articulates a position for ©an
1ft which ha la ahla ta i&agine and plaa his futur*, critithe intuit ha wontt* and oat to attain that fvftMto* Thaaa
processes oro centrally involved $M his hapa fax- a better

action, that is, on activities by which daalfahla change*
are identified and sought after, it would sees that hope can
ha basically umierstood as a fa®* of transcendence.

Mi

m
hoping mm be understood aa transcendence, and tha activiti*a which precede hope aa transcending activities. In tha

wore detailed consideration.
There are striking similarities between nany aspects
of hope theology and secular man's appraisal of the roi© of
•wpirw
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Applications of Hope in Some
Contemporary Contexts
The meaning of hope in this section is organically
related to the for© and content of i»an*s activity in-theworld#

The changes he desires, his actions to effect

change, and his reasons that indicate the possibility of
change are all formative elements of the development of hop®
in this context. The hopes we examine ara those of aggregates of human beings, of societies and nations. Their
hopes are described by individuals who have analyzed various
social and political patterns of events, and have pointed to
a position and a role for hope.
Black America*s struggle toward independence is a
striking example of the relationship between human hope and
»an f s activity in-the-world.

Qs, Martin Luther King*s

(1%9) final published statement, entitled A, Testament, of
Hope, will be considered here because it represents one of
the better articulations of the heartfelt hopes of the American ifegro. Dr« King introduces his testament with the
tae»orys
. * • that only yesterday Negroes were not only
grossly exploited but negated as human beings» They
were invisible in their misery. But the suffering
and silent slave of 110 years ago, an object of
scorn at worst or of pity at best, is today*s angry
man. He Is vibrantly on the move forcing change
rather than waiting for it to happen [p. 174].

m
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Dr. King contends that Negro agitation la causing
America to examine all of i t s interrelated Hmm since all
are esbodied 1A the lot of the Aaerican Negro. Violent
omntlona and ^aval«£tia«»«y notion* fatca a faca*t#*f«sa
eaufrantatiait with pavaftyt parajiniliiaf nilit**!*** and
materialism, and aa aan* occasiona, those actions load to
nooninffnl *IIOO***O*# Mnon vlolont «ptaaayal 1* fallawad hy
something positive, when sorae aspect of tha treatment of
ifagraaa in $faari«a la »«*avali»«tadt and nn*fiittttful nocturia**
tlono coftttltt than tnoxo i t feapa for a nott** way of lifo
f oar tha anajeican Mwgm*
tsm Riftf** onuronnctivo hapa wm eontinnont an tha
anility of tho Mo*** to mm nlaooif aa hnving tho capacity
to iNurtitlnot* IJI tha ontonninotion of Ma onn dootlny * Mia
octiona* viniont aar mhmmkm* that lod t© *ono pooitiv*
social reform, mm tha basis of his hop?. r'As long aa
ip'sa w*^a*^p*
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The- tepa «f the faerie an Negro nay thus be viewed la tno

occur stand a$ reasons vshy the objects of his global hopes
|a more equitable use of political power end a sharing of
opportunitiea) nay be realized, ami are reasons that support
a hopaful outlook fax the future.
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Formulations that explain the actions of the American negro in terms of either 'striving to attain some identifiable goal* or 'learning to be aggressive* way be too
simple or Incomplete. Serkowitz (1972) provided this criticism of the more rational theories and pointed to frustrations &nd other factors as »ore plausible explanations for
tone of the aggressive actions of the American tfegr© during
the last ten years. In Berkowits's terms frustration was
understood to occur when one had been anticipating or expecting a certain pleasurable state of affairs and then found
that the object of his expectation could not be realized.
Borfcowitx suggests that because the flegroes in the Northern
States had experienced better living conditions than flegroes
raised in the Southern States, the northerners had learned
to hope for and expect many of the social goods that society
can provide. However, these expectations were often
thwarted, and the Northerners were actually more frustrated
than their Southern counterparts. As a consequence, the
Megroe© raised in the North were roore likely to initiate and
take part in riots.
BerkowitE also suggests that a person's sense of
self-control is a laajor factor determining how he deals with
his frustrations*

Specifically, there are indications that

a sense of personal efficacy leads to a greater willingness
to initiate and maintain action as on® means of fighting
frustrating conditions. With reference to the Aaerlean

2?
black h® states!

w

this sense of personal control contri-

butes to their militancy, and enables thea to do something
about their frustrations, if only to take violent action
[p. 85]«B

Other factors thought to account for so«® of the

aggressive actions of the American Megro included the
experience of painful stiaulation fro® the environment and
situations where the Negro perceived himself unfavourably
with respect to certain reference groups.
Undoubtedly there are many situations in which the
factors pointed to by JJerkowitz lead to Wegro agitation and
action.

Besides these interpretations it seems equally

likely that on some occasions their actions were based on
their conscious evaluation of situations in which they found
themselves and their choice to change those situations.
Their actions could be understood as the result of a moral
decision and the courage to act upon that decision.
Even though there are ©any different conditions that
would see® to give rise to action, there is strong agreement
with respect to the value of action as a basis of hope.
Robert F. Kennedy viewed greater citizens1 participation as
the only way to check the creeping corruption in America and
foster hope for a better way of life, Arthur Schlesingar Jr.
(1969), a friend to the late Senator, pointed out that
"Robert Kennedy . * . evolved sort of a Christian stoicisa
and existentialism that gave his both a fatalism about life
and an understanding that man's destiny was to struggle

m
against his fate [p. 176].**

In this struggle, Kennedy taw

the actions of men, the actions of the poor, the oppressed,
and the impoverished as the basis of the hope that they
^ould become part of the mainstream of American life.

For

Robert F. Kennedy the future lay beyond the vision of men
but not beyond tiieir ability to control it and influence its
outcome.
Man's acting to change his worldly status was a central ingredient in the concept of hop® articulated by both
Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King.

Both roen acted in

behalf of those who expressed the desire for a better way of
life, and since that time, each has been looked upon as a
martyr of that hope.

Their activity symbolized and brought

sustenance to the hope for a new America.
Erich Froisa (1968) has championed the cause of hope
in his ©ost recent attack on the technological society as
the epitome of a social condition that negates all values of
the humanistic tradition.

He states that the tendency to

install technical progress as the highest value has »ade man
an appendage of the machine, dependent on it and submissive
to it. Man's sense of alienation and his passiveness are
the symptoms of his acceptance of the Technological Deity.
He is passive, he does not relate to the world actively und
is forced to submit to his idols and their demands. Prorata
points to a widespread hopelessness with respect to man's

feelings about being able to change the course of events in
American life.
The Revolution of Hope (1968), one of his latest
works, is a major attempt to describe the means by which a
hopeful outlook raay be instilled in the American people and
the objects of hope may be realized.

He sees violence and

continued passivity as having no positive effectiveness, and
specifies his hope for huiaanixation in terns of the following activities:
(1) planning which includes the system man and is based
on norms which follow froia the examination of the
optimal functioning of the human being?
(2) activation of the individual by methods of grass
roots activity and responsibility, by changing the
present Methods of alienated bureaucracy into om of
humanistic managements
(3) changing the consumption pattern in the direction of
consumption that contributes to activation and discourages passivation!
(4) the emergence of new forms of psycho-spiritual orientation and devotion, which are equivalents of religious systems of the past.
Clearly, Promt sees hope in terms of the positive
actions of men, where such actions »ake use of all available
resources to rebuild the system.
tency of weans md

He attests to a consis-

ends, i.e., positive actions leading to
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positive outcomes.

Froraio's position is based on Albert

Schweitzer's idea of 'reverence for life' which ©ay be
understood to mean that those conditions that help ©an
satisfy his needs and realize his potential in a positive
sense are valued and sought after*
Froiasi depicts the meaning of hope in the context of
a planning process that is designed to bring about the
hoped-for changes. Besides man's potential to act and
assert himself, hope depends on the real possibility of
change in the system.

In Frotan's terras a real possibility

of change means that there are psychological, economic,
social and cultural factors which can be demonstrated—if
not in their quantity, at least in their existence—as a
basis for a possibility of change. Froam's model of hope
points to the necessity of reasons that suggest that the
changes implied in one's hopes are possible. Frota this
point he has developed a plan that will lead man to realize
the global objects of his hopes. The creation of this plan
is itself an additional reason which supports the possibility that hope's objects will be realized and, further, it is
a reason to adopt a hopeful orientation toward the future.
The perspectives provided by Martin Luther King,
Robert F. Kennedy, and Erich Froram attest to a similar
understanding of hop©.

Their hope for a better way of life

encompasses freedom, equal and better opportunities for all,
and greater participation.

These are the global objects of
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their hopes. Since greater participation is one of these
objects, the relationship between man's actions and hope is
especially interesting*

Besides leading to a hopeful out-

look, the actions of men also represent a partial realization of hope's global object, that is the actions of men
are exemplars of the hoped-for greater participation in
American life.

As incidents of the object of hope, they are

reasons (in the sense of direct and unequivocal evidence)
that the global hope may be realized.

The changes resulting

from actions (as for example the changes in the treatment of
the American Megro) are additional reasons to hope for the
global objects such as an equal sharing of political power
and opportunities to lead better lives. At exemplars of a
global object of hope, these reasons also take the form of
direct evidence.
The present picture of hope deserves some qualification.

Hope has been described in situations where people

are striving to attain identifiable goals.

In this context

the nature of hope is closely allied with a well articulated
social-organizational process in which man acts to attain
his goals, identifies reasons why those goals are attainable, as well as a rationale for how they may be obtained.
At this level of conceptualization man's actions and reasons
determine the meaning of hope and provide the basis for a
hopeful outlook for the future.

They are, as wall, the

means by which the contents of the hoped-for future will be

m
realized.

This view of hope is consistent with the picture

of twentieth-century man provided by the hope school of
theology and many other contemporary characterizations of
man's ability to plan, act upon his world, and so determine
his future.
The foregoing examples represent only a small fraction of instances where the concept hope has bmn

applied in

contemporary social contexts. To the best of the author's
knowledge there is a consistent orientation toward an idea
of hope that is based on action and reasons. Furthermore,
there is a strong similarity between these conceptualizations of hope and the psychological treatment of expectation described by Toiman (1948), Rotter (1954), and Atkinson
(1964).

A precise formulation of hope in terms of expecta-

tion has been provided by Stotland (1969) who defines hope
as 'an expectation greater than 0 of achieving a goal.*

The

degree of hopefulness, then, is the level of this expectation or the person's perceived probability of achieving a
particular goal.
Stotland (1969) provides considerable evidence to
support his theory that individuals develop hopeful scheaas
(cognitive frameworks) regarding the efficacy of their own
actions to attain identifiable goals. Hopeful schemas are
invoked as the result of an individual perceiving an event
or events similar to a concept of the schema or by the
individual's receiving a communication from another directing

m
him to Invoke the schema. The probability that the hopeful
schema will be invoked and remain mmmmd

la thought to be a

poaitive function of (a) the number of times It haa naait
invoko* p*avta»aly# in) tno awanar of avanta pra¥i#miy par-*
ceived mm consistent with the schema, and (c) the importance
of the p9m*mt

If amy* who directs the individual to invoke

the schema. Tte process of arousing and maintaining a hopeful schetaa itapiies that the Individual have some rational
basis to da aa* That is, on the oasis of bit oxperience he
identifies reasons that support a hopeful schema about M a
ability to attain a certain goal.
Thaaa reasons nay xofar to aa«pairla**aaa unono M a own
actions iiava hmmm effective 1» attaining goals. In other
v*ords, an individual nay become nop etui about attaining a
awaiNn t^awi**** ^jjp^^^n*fc
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actions have been effective In attaining goals in the past.
From Stotland's treatment of hope in terms of expectation
It la easy to understand why actions and reasons were viewed

described by Martin Luther King, Robert F, Kennedy, and
Erich Frotaa.
The present meaning m§ hop* would seem to no related
to White's (1959J notion of 'competence,' which nay be
understood aa an individual's sense of being able to effect,
control* and cop© with M a environment. An individual's
hopefulness (expectation) about his ability to achieve
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certain goals nay be based aatelasense of competence which,
in turn, la the result of the success of hit actions to
attain goals in previous situations. Farber (in Lester it
Lester, If71) has suggested tnat an individual's hopefulness
about U f a will increase or* decrease aa a function of
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his sense ef competence and his hopefulness will result.
Farber suggests that If the threatening conditions are sufficiently otxono, than tno jrooultina 1*** i* eanpatattea ®w£
aopefulne&s will be accompanied %

an increase in the prate*

iillity of awialda.
The development of hopeful expectations on tho basis
of man's actions can be easily Integrated with tha concept
of reinforcement. More specifically, when an organism's
actions are reinforced by the attainment of some goal, ha
then tea a basis far the hope (expectation) tnat he will be
able to attain other goals in future situations. In this
way, an Individual's hopes can be viewed aa a function of
positive reinforcement. There are nany utilitarian Implications to this view at the conditions that load to hope, but,
obviously, tha application of positive reinforcement would
nave to be adapted to the specific characteristics of pair*
ticular situation*.
Tha relation of positive reinforcement to hope baa
bmm® considered from another point of view. tSawraae (1960)
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described the process of learning in terms of tha organism's
learning to hope air, more specifically, learning that a
particular event signals oncoming reinforcement. He argued
that hope la a prerequisite far action, oimiiarly, Stotland
(1968) saw hope aa & basis for action, and cited evidence
from studies 1 A instrumental learning to support this hypothesis. He tdastifiad hapa aa a oonttsnct union km notit**
tiofi*! onopoxtioo* onon. that 9*o*to* anpaetatiaw nf on*l
attainment would lead to (a) more thought about how to
attain tha $o*l 9 and {») non* aalaetlva *ttonti*n t* connoto
nf tho onrtvoanont colovant to nttolninf tha tool* A * hap®
ooon* to aceur aa a function nf m * f a action** it *»*tid *l*n
seem tnot *otion noon** on a fnttotion of no***

anpaatatian ahawt tha off t«o*y of M a mm notion* t® attain
« ooatain tool t*pr«a#«t» a oin§*i** and aafNtnially f*onion»

thio viow of hapa thono it an *ito*not* parapaatlira that la
§»ntid»d In phenomenology, and will be treated at length In
tha following saetlaa*

A Phanomenological Analysis
Preliminaryfijayif,icaUon.of T e r m s —
Hope, Opf^mfSff, and Wishing
Prusyer (1963) indicated that hope has been used as
a wastebasket term* and often confused with wishing or
optimism. A blurring of the meaning of either or both terms
has occurred where hope has been used interchangeably with
wishing or optimism.

Few writers have attempted to distin-

guish hope from wishing or optimism, and where clarification
has been attempted, there are frequently different distinctions. A survey of some of these differences of opinion
will be helpful in arriving at a clearer understanding of
the phenomenonogieal nature of hope and hoping.
The difference between hope and optimism seems to be
more clear-cut and subject to greater agreement than the
difference between hope and wishing. Before identifying the
former distinction it may be helpful to examine the positions of those who have viewed hope in terms that would seem
more appropriate to a definition of optimism*
Max Hammer (1970) saw hope as a camouflage for the
apperception of what really exists in the world.
W® are encouraging a pathological process when wa
encourage a person to reject &nd deny the raality of
what Jjt and instead encourage him to pursue what
ought to be. And this is exactly what hope does
tp> 153.
Hammer thought that there is the inherent suggestion in hope

m

m
that light will come even if it involves circumventing the
darkness of despair. He concluded that there can be no
legitimate role for hope in the process of psychotherapy*
With his dismissal of hope, he also discarded the value of a
future time perspective in psychotherapy, an omission that
is both psychologically and philosophically unsound, and one
that few psychotherapists would be likely to make.
Waterman (1970) described the state of excessive or
blind optimism in terms of unbounded hopefulness. This form
of hope was said to occur when one person is extremely
optimistic about another's situation and tries to cheer him
or pressure him to likewise be optimistic.

This hope is

expressed as a way of avoiding conflict, maintaining the
status quo, and feeling secure in ongoing relationships even
though they may really be unsatisfactory.

The expressions

of this form of hope lead to a hopeless situation because no
real change in relationship is possible*
. . * certain expressions of hopefulness become
stereotyped and are repeated in the same form much
as a record that plays over and over again for
hundreds or thousands of times. The response to the
hopeful statement is also repeated with little variation. Mo new information is given and nothing
changes [p. 45]»
Waterman appropriately called this form of hoping *a Poilyana
Ritual.*
Others have expressed the view that hoping implies
the rejection of reality. Menninger (1959) pointed out that
some have seen hope as a counter-phobic denial of the horror

3*
and despair born of self-destructive trends or the imminence
of existential doom.

Similarly, Aronov (1970) ascribed the

role of a defence to hope. More specifically, hope was seen
as a means by which a child defends against painful feelings
related to a very uncomfortable life situation.
. . . the child's fantasy is that things will
better when he*s older, as he will be able to
things now forbidden to him but allowed older
lings, or he will be allowed freedoms allowed
older children generally [p. 43],

be
do
sibto

Aronov describes this type of hoping as basically only a
flight into the future, an escape from living with the realities of the present. This form of hope is again consistent
with the idea that in hoping one rejects a portion of reality.
It is interesting to note that those who have
attempted to describe the activity of hoping more precisely
have made the degree of reality contact that which principally distinguishes hoping from optimism.

Marcel (1965)

understood the optimist as one who takes a position some
distance from reality so that certain obstacles that previously seemed insurmountable then seemed attenuated.

Keen

(1963) suggested that optimism is based on illusion—in the
Freudian sense—in that it arises out of a drive for wish
fulfillment which ignores evidence to the contrary. Optimism seems to imply the selective perception of reality, the
ignoring or denying part of reality because the facts would
force an interpretation that the optimist v^ouid not want to
make*

m
In contrast, hoping has been identified with precisely those situations where one accepts all the evidence,
good or bad, that relates to the possibility that one's hope
will be realized.

The experience of hope is thought to

acknowledge a plurality of facts, including those aspects of
reality that are not conducive to the realization of one*s
hope.

It is this acceptance of reality that is supposed to

provide the basis for hope (Fromm, 1968$ Marcel, 1965;
Wenninger, 1959; Prusyer, 1963).

This distinction between

hope and optimism is accepted here and will be subject to
further elaboration in the course of the development of the
phenomenal nature of hope.

This elaboration will consist in

a more detailed analysis of the reality encompassed in the
experience of hope.
Hoping has also been defined in terms of the activity of wishing.

For example, French (in Prusyer, 1963)

identified hope as wishes for something and Menninger (1959)
described hope as the consciousness of a realizable wish.
Others have provided distinctions between these terras. For
example, while French ascribed the activity of hoping to
circumscribed goals (specific objects), Marcel saw wishing
in terms of certain specific objects, but not hope, For
Marcel, hope was supposed to refer to global objects alone,
to states such as freedbm, justice, and salvation.
While there is. a difference between specific and
global objects, it is also the case that where one hopes for
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a global object he may be able to describe some of the particulars encompassed by that object.

Limiting hopefs

objects to global states may well be a function of Marcelfs
metaphysical orientation and the close association of hope
with theological contexts for which there has been no concretize tion.

But man does express his hope in both concrete

and abstract terms. The object level distinction may not be
the best way to differentiate hoping from wishing.

This

does not deny the value of a metaphysical approach to or
understanding of hope*

It does seem to point, however, to

the possibility that as there are many meanings of hope,
there may also be different forms of the experience we call
•hope.'
Marcel further distinguished wishing from hope on
the basis that wishing is closely associated with an urge
toward tension discharge while hoping is not. He thought
that wishing was followed by action, internal (as in hallucinating) or external (as in motor behaviour).

In contrast,

hoping was viewed as a state that Is connected with patience,
forebearance, waiting and awaiting; and not with action, but
with receptivity.
An alternate distinction has bmn

provided by

Prusyer (1963) who suggested that wishing leads to magic,
while in hope the magical elements are replaced by reality
testing.

He states:

"It [hope] presupposes that a person

have maximal orientation to all aspects of his . . .
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situation, including the barriers and obstacles he finds
. , , [pp. 91-92].H

This difference between hoping and

wishing, of course, is the same distinction that has been
drawn between hope and optimism.
In drawing distinctions between hoping, wishing and
optimism, sometimes there is a tendency to see one activity
precluding the possibility of others.

It is realistically

possible that a particular individual will hope for, wish
for, and be optimistic about a certain state of affairs. On
the basis of the degree of reality contact one might think
that wishing and optimism could precede hoping, and lead to
hope as more of reality was encompassed; or, the shattering
of hope might be followed by a form of resigned optimism.
If wishing and hope or hope and optimism occur in close temporal relationship, it might be said that either pair form
an experiential complex.

Lynch (1965), for example,

attested to this view and saw in hope the element of wishing
itself.
The recognition that wishing and hoping may occur as
a complex is important from the point of view that in trying
to understand one concept (hope) more clearly, one may tend
to over-isolate it from similar concepts (wishing, optimism).
It remains, however, that human experience is not always as
fractionated as we might like to think, or as our thinking
allows us to make if. Although the present analysis accepts
the general distinction that in hoping one is in closer
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contact with reality than in wishing and optimism, it also
recognizes that wishing and optimism may be important elements in the experience of hope.
It is the author's preference at this time, however,
to delve more deeply into other aspects of the experience of
hope.

It is clear that the thoughts and experiences of some

individuals have led them to ascribe to hope a variety of
features that constitute the phenomenal reality to which
'hope' refers.

The following sections examine that reality.

Despair and Hopelessness
The many forms of the experience of darkness may be
thought to include exhaustion, despondency, depression and
demoralization (Harper, 1968).

Although the alternatives to

hope may be any of these, despair »nd hopelessness are
thought to be the most intimate companions of hope. First,
there is a theoretical connection between these concepts
since despair and hopelessness are thought to point to some
of the qualities of hopefulness.

Second, there is an experi-

ential connection since hopelessness and despair are often
viewed as antecedent conditions to the experience of hope.
Fromm (1968) identified some of the behavioural consequences of hopelessness at the social level of function.
As examples, he points to the bored expressions of the average person, the lack of contact between people, and the lack
of the capacity to plan seriously for overcoming the ever-
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increasing pollution of our natural ecology.

From Fresno's

perspective loss of hope is typically followed by (a) resigned
optimism which hopes for the best without bothering to
recognize that not even the good, but perhaps the worst may
occur, (b) hardening of the heart or loss of compassion or
empathy, and (c) destructiveness and violence.

Besides

these effects of the loss of hope, man also expresses his
hopelessness in phrase making and adventurism, in forcing
what cannot be forced, and in his nihilistic philosophies.
Raskin (1970) stated that such symptoms may be Increasingly
observed in the behaviour of twentieth-century youth. He
states that young people who formerly seemed to be on the
brink of having it made now seem gripped with despair. Both
Fromm and Easkin see hopelessness and despair in a great
variety of activities that constitute the substance of
twentieth-century life.
The individual experiences of hopelessness and
despair are thought to be characterized by alienation from
those relationships that man needs and desires to feel at
home in the world.

Despair and hopelessness entail a sense

of loss of mutuality, where mutuality is understood in terms
of positive relationships between man and the world, person
and person, or man and himself.

This experience may be

accompanied by feelings of the 'too muchness of life,' the
feeling of overwhelming futility, and a sense of the impossible (Lynch, 1965).

"•a1"*

It has bmn

said that the despairing person cannot

perceive any goals that are worth striving for. Despair
seems to be very similar to the state known as existential
frustration and some forms of depression in which man cannot
envision any meaning possibilities to be fulfilled and the
environment is experienced as impoverished (Frankl, 1959).
In despair there do not appear to be any resources (internal
or external) that the individual can call upon and, even if
there were, he could not find reason to take advantage of
them.

Despair seems to entail the phenomenal absence of

valued end-states as well as the means to attain such endstates.

Despair can be viewed as a form of entrapment in

which the individual's temporal perspectives are exclusively
past and present. There are only those past experiences
that led an individual to despair and the present moment of
despair itself. Man experiences himself as trapped in an
endlessly painful present on the basis of his past experiences. His structures of thought, imagination, and feeling
are rigid and inflexible.

They are absolutized as the only

reality—as the only possible reality.
Marcel (1965) suggests that despair is a form of
enchantment whose action has a bearing on all that goes on
to form the very substance of a person's life.

The despair-

ing man accepts only the perspective of established experience and believes that time will bring nothing new.

m
Tha despairing man not only contemplates and aata
before himself tha dismal repetition, tha external*
iiation of a situation In which he it caught like a
ship In a ae« of ice. By & paradox that la difficult to inafifta* ha anticipates this repetition
f Marcel* 196S* p. 1*2}*
lata of hope, hopelessness and despair have been
aoooelatod with oitttotiono w h a m tha inability to adapt to
environmental factors sometimes leads to death.

The tarns

*swddan dmth* have ofton bean uaad to describe situations
in whieh death aecwra ahartly after organisms have boon
exposed to soma threatening stimulus.

In situations like

this da&th la thought to ha pracipitatad by tha nnyeho*
la§iea! affect of throat that mmrm

to xonXtoo hadlly resia-

tonco and oUowo path#la§y to take avar andt somotinas,
daath la thouont to oecu* aa tha digoot result of poyaho*
lotioal footnro thomoolvoo*

Moorloo (1959) stated that in

a w e oltuationo death any ha pwraly tha roawlt of w a r *
whelming fa&r and aental shock, #$ ®Kp®timm%$4 In «orid
liar IX altar tremendous fright, and ma seen far example in
vooooo death»
Besides death fnam obvious fear there seem to ha
other psychological states that a m equally dangerous and
debilitating. Mara specifically, hopelessness nas been
identified as a precursor of death In % i-vide variety of
situations*

In tha casa of apathy deaths or 'giva-up-itlst•

111 particular, death would aeett to ha closely related to
tha dynamics of hopelessness and despair. Tha form of
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reaction where an Individual seams to give up, than pines
away mnd. dies, contrasts with tha reaction of those who
panic and literally aaan to die of fright. In tha cas« of
apathy death tha individual actually ^mmm to accept tha
idea of death and dies without any apparent panic.
Physiological interpretations have boon provided to
help us understand hath types of dsath. Cannon (1942),
far example, interpreted death from fright «a a consequence
of proJkonnad o*o**tliMsi.ntion «f tha syi^athati£@**diawal
system, tfhon an individual it threatened by some aspect
#f tha anviirannant and sonata la pani® «

flight* ha nonil*

lxo« hadlly raaainreaa for aetian that will ononlo M m to
daal with tha particular threat. If action la not possible
and a hiojh lovol of bodily activity it nalntalnad* dooth. la
ofton quick to follow* Victino ara a^aetad to hraatha vary
rapidly, have a rapid pulse, and show a hefaocoacentration
sotttitifti f ran loaa of fluids from tha hl«ad t# tha tlaawaa.
Tha heart beats faster and footo* leading to a state of
constant contraction and, ultimately, to cardiac arrest and
daath.
Apathy daatha a* fivn«an*itio hava nana attritouiad
to a different physiological reaction on tha basis of
ftl«htar*a (lf»7) a^arlnantatlan with **to«

Riehtar found

that shortly attar tnoataian 1 M a tank of watar some domesticated rata would twin to the bottom and die. Tha incidance
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of this form of death Increased when the rats* whiskers were
clipped, depriving there of important orienting information.
Sosie rats died before iraaaersion during the time that they
were constrained in a pouch used to deliver them from their
cage to the water tank.

Suspecting over-activity of the

sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, the
investigators measured heart rate by electrocardiographic
procedures.

The recordings showed an initial high rate and

then a slowing to the time of death. Slowing of respiration
and a lowering of body temperature were also observed.
Ultimately the heart stopped in diastole after
having shown a steady gradual decrease in rate* As
expected, autopsy revealed a large heart distended
with blood. These findings indicate that the rats
way have died a so-called vagus death, which is the
result of over-stimulation of the parasympathetic
rather than the syupatheticoadrenal system.
It should be pointed out that the first
response to stress, whether that of restraint in the
hand or confinement in the water jars, was often m
accelerated heart rate; only subsequently, with prolongation of the stress situation, was this followed
by slowing. In sosie rats the latter response
developed very promptly, in others not for a few
minutes [p. 196J.
It is especially significant that the sequence of
reactions from apparent panic to an acceptance of the situation and giving up is paralleled where huraans have found
themselves in situations wh®x:@ escape is perceived as impossible, i.e. hopeless situations. Basedow {in Barker, 1963)
has presented a vivid picture of this reaction as the result
of bone-pointing*

4S
The man who discovers that he is being boned by any
enemy is, indeed, a pitiable sight. He stands
aghast, ¥<?ith his eyes staring at the treacherous
pointer, and with hands lifted as though to ward off
the lethal medium, which he imagines is pouring into
nis body. His cheeks blanch and his eyes become
glassy and the expression on his face becomes terribly distorted. . . . He attempts to shriek but
usually the sound chokes in his throat, and all that
one might see is froth at his mouth. His body
begins to tremble and the swseles twist involuntarily. He sways backwards and falls to the ground,
and after a short time appears to be in a swoon? but
soon after he writhes as if in mortal agony, and,
covering his face with his hands, begins to »oan.
After a while he becomes very composed and crawls to
his hut. . . * His death is only a matter of a comparatively short time [p. 21j.
In situations such a© the one described above, the social
behaviour of the tribe would seera to have a strong influence
on how a native reacts to bone-pointing and, for that matter, to any form of voodoo that is supposed to result in
death.

The iraaediate family, relatives, and friends of the

native often withdraw their support.

The bone-pointed

native is left alone, regarded as taboo, and even treated as
if he were dead*

At a later point the tribe may perfona

funeral rites where the native's next of kin sever his
remaining contacts with the world and place hira in the
proper position for dying.

The suggestive power of these

activities, to a person who already believes that he will
die, would surely serve to maintain and/or increase his
hopelessness over his situation and, ultimately, hasten his
complete glving-up.
The phenomenon of giving up under conditions of
despair and hopelessness has been observed in diverse

m
contexts.

The effect of hopelessness and despair may also

vary in degree, from death in extreme situations to apathy
and passivity in less extreme situations. Meerloo (1959)
has indicated that persons starving during a famine often
exhibit a cataleptic passivity and a surrender to death.

It

has been observed that children excluded from the home, community, or separated from the parents, sometimes exhibit a
cataleptic reaction, that is a sudden iaBUobiiization and
passivity,

in the catalepsy of catatonia patients often

describe their inner experience as being dead and waiting
for rebirth.

"Before their complete withdrawal fro» the

world, these patients have sudden feelings of dying, the
delusion of being crucified or drowned, or the feeling of a
catastrophic decline in the world [Meerloo, 1959, p. 385]. M
The author is also aware of incidents where boats have capsized and their occupants siiaply sink and drown with no
apparent effort to stay afloat or save themselves.

It seeias

that there are a great variety of situations sphere individuals tend to give up, become passive and motionless when
they have been confronted by a threat. Such phenomena have
bmm observed in animals, and in men in both primitive and
more sophisticated cultures.
The experiences of inmates in concentration camps
provide many clear examples of what appears to be despair.
Frankl (1959) has described what he saw as a typical reaction to incarceration:

-ao
Usually it began with the prisoner refusing one
morning to get dressed &md wash or go out on the
parade grounds. No entreaties, no blows, no threats
had any effect. He just lay there, hardly moving.
If this crisis was brought about by illness, he
refused to be taken to the sick-bay or to do anything to help himself, He simply gave up. There he
remained lying in his own excreta, and nothing
bothered hira anymore [p. 113].
i

Frankl stated that many men in the concentration

1

camp believed that the real opportunities in life had
passed.

Those who saw no sense in life, no aln, and no pur-

pose, saw no reason for carrying on.
be absolutely without a future.

Their lives seemed to

Soase regarded their lives

as over and done, as if they had already died.
was to rob the present of its reality.

The effect

It was easy to over-

look opportunities to make something positive of camp life,
to take advantage of opportunities that really did exist.
There was no hope for those who did not see a future.
Frankl points out that any atteopt to restore a
man's inner strength in the camp had first to succeed in
showing him son*© future goal.

This idea has essentially the

saae meaning as the often-quoted phrase by Nietzsche:

"he

who has a why to live for can bear alaost any how.'* In
other words, the individual who sees some purpose or goal in
his life is taore able to endure the pain he encounters on
the road to fulfilling that purpose or attaining that goal.
From Frankl's point of view, having a future goal or purpose
made the crucial difference; it was their salvation in the
most difficult moments of existence; it gave them hope.

,

u
The accounts of concentration carap experiences,
apathy deaths, and other phenomena in this section provide a
basis for drawing a tentative distinction between hopelessness and despair.

On the one hand, hopelessness may be a

state where a person feels that a certain goal cannot be
attained, though he remains aware of that goal, desires and
values it.

In despair, on the other hand, there way be an

actual devaluing of goals, leading to an absence of goals
and the phenomenal experience of roeaninglessness. The person who gives up nay actually give up a goal or goals that
were once very important.

ttPPa. **hd fit0.AMY
From the Meanings attributed to hopelessness and
despair it would seem that the experience of hope is closely
associated with the notion of possibility.

Possibility may

be understood to mean that reality cannot be exhaustively
defined or predicted. Keen (1968) suggests that hope begins
here, that is, with the realization that hu»an experience is
inadequate to deal with all the possibilities that reality
harbours.

One might say that in hope there is the implicit

recognition that reality is not fixed or crystallized, but
open-ended and contains resources that have not been discovered.

Resources siay refer to valued end-states or goals,

as well as the ©tans by which goals can be realized.
This element of possibility in hope is closely
related to our view of the past. Marcel (1965) stated that

m
in hope there is the realization that wthe aore the real is
real the less does it lend itself to a calculation on the
basis of accepted experience [p. 191]. w

In hope one adopts

a different orientation than those who adhere only to the
real® of past experience and the knowledge accrued from such
experience. The acceptance of past reality as the only
reality brings with it the ". . . supposition that time will
bring nothing new beyond an illustration or an added confirmation of the pronouncements engraved on the tables of
universal wisdom . . . [Marcel, p. 191]***

This is the same

as saying that we live in a world where time no longer
passes or where time passes but does not bring anything new.
Although past life aay be the surest and the most
certain life lived, it is obviously not the only life. Hope
attests to alternate life—store enigmatic, uncertain, and at
first only contained in the notion of possibility.

Hope

seems to have little bearing on the realm of rights and certainties based on past experience.

It encompasses a broad

reality which includes yet goes beyond what established
experience has to offer.
It has been said that the procesa hoping entails two
views of one world, two views that encompass contrasting
qualities of experience.

On the one hand, there art the

ingredients of experience that give reason to despair or
become hopeless; on the other hand, there is the realm of
possibility within which there is rooa for something positive
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to occur* this viewpoint haa boon cifWC«»o4 by Mareal and
others. Raskin (1970) doptatad hope aa a»c#ap#*aiii§ p&lj*
and tragedy aa wall aa beauty and Jay*

1 A reference to hla

personal dovolojMont, Ooroff (1970) talked of how tea had
m&vwk from an unfeeling state to a place whore ha axperienced hath groatox pain and a positive feeling ha called
hope.
Tha accoptajieo of e«ntraatia# qaalitloo of axpaari*
oneo ouoffoata that lit hap* aa* istttvas tawrd m i«tagrati«i
of xaalityfa oontonto* Thia viou wm c*pso«totf by tciarfea*
gaard who oo* in hapa tha attaspt to raaolva tha nantradla**
tiom of U f a thrattfh a ayathaaia of «»«asalty mA poaalbil*
Ity (la Pxuoyor* 1963)* Similarly, Stan* (1970) §«* hapa aa
a unifying faotor Nfelch d « w » 4X«pcxatc olamnt* together
within tha aognitivo f laid, In haplnf one wm%toam i d to
attempt to integrate peat aispaiieiica with vital feere and mm
Mononto and an opattaaas and viafeility in tha face of tha
fwtwra (Marina, 1970)*
There i« a certain similarity between tha view that
hope eervet an integrating function and AUport*e (190ft)
nation of tha 'prapriyat* or thaaa aapacte of tha poroonal«»
Ity that ara central to existence and make far Inward unity*
It waa /Ulparfc** pooition that preprlate functioning
includes conflict and la basically opposed Or resistant to
equilibrium In human life* i.e.,

tension hatttfaan tha actual

§4
and the possible is maintained rather than reduced.

It is

interesting to note that Stern (1970) thought that to truly
entertain hope one must disregard the terras resolution of
conflict, since hope exists within an ever-expanding organismic tension system.

He saw the therapist's most important

task as that of providing reverence for the dynamic tension
that is found in hope.
As hoping seems to entail an awareness of the possible, the hopar nay be understood to experience a sense of
futurity in the present (Stern, 1970),

In hope there seeds

to be a sense of af fines tion of what the future holds in
store, that which represents an alternative to past and
present negative states of affairs*

This sense of affirma-

tion ©ay be closely associated with the element of belief.
Although the relationship between hope and belief has not
been thoroughly examined to the bast of the author1s knowledge, there seem to be good reasons to identify belief as a
central element in the experience of hope.

ftftA^t Mm*,,m$,M%M$p-mpm ,<**.,ftforcnM.,fit»Mty,
The idea that belief is soaetistes an important
aspect of tha experience of hope is supported by some preliminary data. A number of students who were asked to
describe what hope meant to then responded with meanings
such as "belief," "belief in the future—for the good,** md
M

a total personal coamiitjaent to believing that something

»

will or will not happen."

Several theorists have also

pointed to the role of belief in the experience of hope.
For Wheatley (1958) hoping entailed 'belief in possibility*
and Lynch (1965) stated that hope w . * . i s energized by the
belief in the possibility of getting somewhere, in the possibility of reaching goals [p. 31]. M Baunana (1970) defined
hope as **. * . knowing where you are inside yourself and
with the world . . . then truly believing in both [p. 62]."
Day (1969) felt that the belief in hope was rational or
based on evidence. Since the hoping person was understood
to believe in a probability estimate that was based on evidence indicating that what was hoped for would be realized,
his belief, therefore, was based on evidence and a process
of reasoning.
It is important to recognise that the absence of
evidence or reasons in support of a belief does not preclude
the possibility of believing.

As Tiilich (1957) points outs

"Sometimes . . . one believes something which has a low
probability or is strictly improbable, though not impossible
[p. SI].1*

Sargant (1968) has described numerous instances

where people have suddenly and uncritically accepted ideas,
thoughts, and happenings which sake nonsense and contradict
all the rest of their ordered and computed knowledge.

He

states that under conditions of stress new impressions, commands and ideas often become iaperatlve in their nmd

for

acceptance and ring absolutely true; they are believed*

m
Tiilich and Sargant have identified a form of belief
that has bmn

more explicitly defined by Meissner (1969) as:

", . . a n assent to and acceptance of a truth and a reality
without the usual props of intellectual conviction [p. 50]. w
In this kind of belief om

cannot ascribe reasons or provide

arguments or point to compelling evidences. The belief is
set off from reason, and sometimes opposed to it. The
believer is rationally vulnerable. While in reasoning on©
arrives at his convictions and certitudes by a process of
investigation and argument, in this kind of belief one does
not.
It is generally understood that beliefs are psychological necessities throughout the course of life; they
stand as positively adaptive elements within the psychic
economy*

Beliefs help to maintain and elaborate one's self-

identity as it acknowledges an identification with meaningful institutions and ideologies.

It is not an oversimplifi-

cation to say that beliefs, like hopes, often attest to the
reality of a meaningful world,
Hope and belief seem to be related at another level
of analysis.

If hope is understood as an assent to, and

2
Although many theorists would draw a distinction
between faith and belief, Sargant (1968) and Meissner (1969)
use the two terms interchangeably. To avoid confusion in
the present analysis, the word 'faith' should be understood
to refer to the definition of belief provided by Meissner.
Any other meaning of the word faith is beyond the scope of
this analysis.

tw
acceptance and affirmation of the possible or a specific
possibility in situations where past and present experience
suggests a highly negative state of affairs, then hoping
would sometimes seem to involve an act that transcends or
contradicts the content of established experience*

If this

is so, then an act of belief, that is belief in possibility,
¥**ould seem to be one way in which an individual could accomplish this transcending act. The hoper may acknowledge the
truth and reality of a possibility or a specific possibility
solely through an act of belief, without being able to offer
intellectual support for that belief.
The role of belief in the experience of hope may be
further described In theoretical terms.

It has already hmm

pointed out that in hope one may affirm a possible good to
come in spite of evidence to the contrary. As Prusyer
(1963) has noted, however, in hoping one does not predicate
that such and such will happen, nor does one claim that such
and such must happen. Hope is outside the realm of rights
and certainties.
fect certainty.

Likewise, most beliefs do not entail perBeliefs are rarely perfect, and although a

person can affirm in belief, that belief is always being
challenged by reasons to the contrary, all the finite evidence of which the believer is aware. Beliefs can never be
static or complete. They are dynamic and their realisations
are never total or final (Meissner, 1969).

although belief

does consist in an affirmation, the process of believing
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inclydea doubt and uncertainty due to contradictory elements
in the field*

This understanding of belief would seem to ha

a further raaaaa to eee belief aa part of tha etyneftice of
hoping* tfcie la eseentially what Calian (1969) seemed to
understand when ha atated that it la tha alaaanta of aff ine*
ation and contradiction «hich allow far hmpm and serve to
maintain it«

Siftilarlyt this wa«ld ooeai to he what Prwayar

i 1963) meant when ha said that certainty md uncertainty
aaiet hath ha present in mwdms far hoeing to occur*
The uncertainty of a hope hmmd ©n belief la
reflected In etatemnt* which attribute a certain fragility
%nd delicacy to hope, the following axaftplat illustrate
thio point*
CI) Hope is Ilka a harebell trembling from ita birth**
Ca) Mopaa m y ha frail but fond*Tha fragility of hope again attaete to what ia understood
about tha dynamics of belief9 where one haa tha capacity to
acknowledge a positive possibility in epite of evidence to
tha contrary andt at tha same time, la subject to moments of
doubt and uncertainty on tha baaia of that vary evidence*
Tha role of belief in tha emparlance of hope it fur*
ther supported on the basis that the conditions which pre*
cede belief md hope are frequently the same. Sargant
(1968) haa indicated that there ara many instances where
total despair end dmmp depression have bean followed by
feelings of salvation and faith:
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The sudden and desired change, with the acquisition
of a 'saving* faith, generally took place only under
tremendous emotional pressures of guilt, anxiety,
and feelings of personal helplessness md impending
disaster [p. 508J.
Sargant pointed out that absolute passivity and giving up in
battle are often followed by the acquisition of a faith or
belief, Madame Guyon, a great Quietist, also expressed this
opinion:

" . . . perfect souls are those without action,

without inclination . . . and 'in a state of complete death*
until sudden breakthrough to faith occurs [in Sargant, 1968,
p# 512]."

The similarity of the conditions that precede the

acquisition of a belief and the experience of hope would
seem to further support the possibility that belief sometimes plays an important role in the experience of hope.
The present analysis suggests that hope may be
experienced without the aid of reasons that suggest that the
possibility to which hope refers will be realized.

On this

basis, it is possible to speak of an experience of hope that
depends on only the symbolic representation or image of a
certain possibility that is initially accepted without
analysis or criticism through an act of belief} or, in a
more general sense, depends simply in belief in possibility.
This approach to the experience of hope clearly contrasts
with the earlier and more cognitive view of hope as expectation, involving a process of reasoning and an estimation of
probabilities.
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The Individual who hopes for a specific possibility
may be understood to be living in a state \*th®x® Inconsistent
perceptions co-exist. Although he accepts a certain possibility as real, he remains aware of information that contradicts the possibility of his hope being realized.

On the

basis of the previous distinction between wishing, optimism,
and hop®, the person who wishes or is optimistic would probably be more likely to deny contradictory evidence rather
than accept it.
The sense of affirmation experienced in hope is consistent with the view that hope helps man endure his trials
and sufferings, all the negatives of life to which he is
exposed. Wenninger (1959) looked at hope in terms of its
sustaining function in life, and Prusyer saw in hope the
determination to stick with the scheme of things. The same
thought was expressed differently by Raskin (1970)?

"Hope

provides the spirit for going on with life, the knowledge
that life is a struggle, the acceptance of it being a struggle [p. 38]." The sustaining effect of hope can be associated with the idea that hope is a 'comforter' (Stern, 1970),
that the affirmation of possibility in hope attenuate© painful conditions in the present. Emily Uickinson also saw
this aspect of hope.

In a poem entitled Hone she wrote:

And sweetest in the gal® is heard;
And sore must be the storm
That could abash the little bird
That kept so many warm*
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Tha view of hope m* « cossforter and a sustainer la
consistent with the idea that tha experience of nope i«
antithetical to death and hfyman dapotantlatlen mml closely
tied to tha workinga of tha life Instinct. Bit a latter view
mm axpraaead by Prossa (1963) who viewed hope mm a psychic
cawaltaaat to U f a and growth, it wae alailarly expressed
by M a w m o (1970)t

***** hop* la a creative forcaf the

directed energy at being which originates, touches, moves,
inspire* and bullda Cp* 863 •*
Marcel likened tha mmprntimnttm of b*p# to a f aailng
of trust In tha process of continual creation*

To hops

meant first accepting tha pain aa real and, while doing so,
seeing It aa capable of being absorbed ami transmuted by tha
working* of a trtatlva probata of ftowtfe end davelopaeiit*
Marcei thought that hoping actually required tome degree of
surrender1 to faircaa aKtasaal to anaaalff to tha power of
a n t e a and tha reality of yet wrartallwd possibility*

Tula

act of depend®!*©© seemed to acknowledge that hop© §i»y not

self-initiated a&tlaft* lilt alaa Oil what aitlaes independontly
of hla action. The locus of responsibility asovsa to external force* hecaitea Marcel thought that despair always pre*
€mdm4 hop*, and the despairing person could not perceive
himself at able to change hla situation.
In situations where an individual deea accept a oar*
tain possibility and thus experiences hope* an important

m
orfenltftic variable nay be the Individual^ auaGoptibllity
to e*i#ge»tl@n aa thia aliewe him to »«#apt and baliava in a
certain possibility, and thus experience hope* The importance of suggestion is probably raost relevant to hope baaed
on ballet A e r o belief involves trusting seasons else.
tealdee that fern of belief in which someone acknowledges
•earthing to be tnta without b«ia§ able to offer auffiaieat
reason, there it alao that form of belief where sooeone la
truttad without beiiif able to offer Mftlciejit rewona for
that trust. The individual who trusts someone eis© would be
lifcaly to aeeapt thair •uggaatlone with regard to tha poa*
eifela or •pacific poealbilitiae* and hone* could eitpari#n«e
hope through Jtflneona «lse#
la thia torn

of beplai tha individual wtwld mm® to

e**itowl#dfa that hla paraonal rccaurcc* are not efwwiii or
outf ielent in tbawelve** that they nuat be added to imm
the antatda*

To emparlance hope in thia way» mm would not

need to pummlm

hlaaelf aa being able to bring about what

ha hopes fori rather, ha nay perceive bJjaeeii aa having to

object of hla hope* Thia lad lynch (1965) to poalt tha ale*
went of mutuality In hope—that la hope depends on an inter*
acting relationship, an interacting contribution that occurs
between wan and tha world* or between person and person, out
of which something new and free la b o m .
occurs

9

"A* it [hope]

• * it means nothing laaa than that mm can depend
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on one another [Lynch, 1965, p. 24j.M

3

H© subsequently

defined hope as M• . . an interior sense that there is help
on the outside of us [in Stein, 1971, p. 221]."
,\fo.pte on MetaDhy.^^ca\.,M9P^*'"^,ahrie^ Mffrfce,!,
The dynamics of hoping are often depicted in settings where the content of hope refers to identifiable endstates or objectives.

This form of hoping is characteristic

of locutions such as M l hope that . • ." or "There is hope
that . . . . w Many of those who describe hope refer its
contents to specific and meaningful possibilities. Marcel's
position is an exception to this orientation since he
describes hope at a different level of huraan experience.

In

Marcel*s terms one does not hope for specific possibilities,
but for global and, sometimes, for unspecifiable states.
The objects of hope are vague and diffuse. Marcel provides
a metaphysical perspective characterized by the expression
"I hope" rather than "I hope that . . . • *
Marcel viewed the hoping person as transcending both
the specific objects to which he might initially be attached
and the desire for such objects. His understanding of hope
3
Although it represents a departure from the present
phenonenologicai analysis, it is worthwhile to point out
that Stotland (1968) has treated the experience of hope
where hope is contingent on others in terms of the concept
of expectation. More specifically, Stotland indicates that
communications from others or the mere perception of others
in certain situations are events that can arouse hopeful
schemas (expectations). Such schemas may apply to either
the individual's personal ability to achieve certain goal©
or the ability of others to aid him or achieve those goals
for hiou
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was bound up in what he termed M . . . a method of surmounting, by which thought rises above the imaginings md formulations upon which it had first be®n tempted to depend
[p* 185].**

He describes his position its super-rational and

untechnical, i.e., not concerned with how the content of
hope will be realized.

He saw hope as an absolute quality,

free from all the limitations of specific circumstances.

He

stateds
W© can imagine the Inner disposition of one who,
setting no condition or limit and abandoning himself
in absolute confidence, would thus transcend all
possible disappointment and would experience a
security of his being, which Is contrary to the
radical insecurity of Having [p. 186].
. . „ only those beings who are entirely free from
the shackles of ownership in all its forms are able
to know the divine light-heartedness of life in hope
[p. 200].
As Marcel understood hope to be a transcendent reality and a quality of spiritual life, it did not involve any
process of reasoning.

For Marcel, the placing of one's con-

fidence in reasons and the holding to a specific object
orientation could only result in a distortion of what he
considered to be the true nature of hope.

If one did so,

Marcel felt that he would lose the aptitude for hope, as
well as the ability to believe in its possibility.
Marcel's idea that the hoping person is oriented
toward valued states of * being* rather than material states
deserves particular emphasis.

This position is similar to

Allport's (1955) concept of fbecoming* where human values

may be understood as the terrain! of our hopes, though
to be fully realized.

Stern (1970) also expressed this view

of hope when he defined it as %
their becoroingness*

never

. # man and his world in

It is a never-ending process of finding

the authentic task which may never be fully found [p» 20],"
The metaphysical understanding of hope represents a
meaningful extension of the range of meanings encompassed by
the concept of hope. That there are many meanings of hope
would seem to suggest that what we call *hQpQ* may be
experienced in different ways and in varied contexts. Hope
may be one concept that meaningfully reflects the vicissitudes and complexities that characterize human life.

Overview and Commentary
The present analysis of hop® has drawn from a wide
variety of sources to provide aroulti-meaningperspective,
as well as an outline of some of the conditions that seem to
be Involved in the experience of hope. Apart from the
numerous meanings ascribed to hope and the varied levels of
abstraction at which hope can be viewed, there appear to be
two major trends of thought concerning the conditions that
pertain to the experience of hope*
First of all, there is a contemporary model that
depicts the experience of hope in situations where an individual *s ties to reality are rational and he is perceived as
an action-oriented being. His hope is based on his personal
abilities to achieve whatever he hopes for and the reasons
he has for seeing hiwself as able to do so. This view of
hope would seera to be most closely associated with the concept of expectation and the estimation of probabilities that
certain goals will be attained.

A primary value attributed

to hope in contemporary contexts is its functional utility,
that is, how hope helps raan attain his goals.
The alternate picture of hope is grounded in phenomenology and emphasizes (a) man's receptivity to and dependence on the resources of external reality, and (b) the
awareness of possibility generally and/or the acceptance of
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a particular possibility as these entail an act of belief.
The role of belief in the experience of hope is especially
significant since there are many situations in which reasons
to hope may not be available, and even if they are, they nay
not be sufficiently strong to counteract reasons that suggest that what one hopes for Is unlikely or impossible.
Besides these characteristics, the value of hope in the
phenomenological context seems to lie in its sustaining and
comforting effect rather than the actualization or attainment of specific goals.
Although there are two fairly distinct formulations
of hope in the literature, it may be unwise to think of the
experience of hope only in terras of one form of the experience or the other.

On some occasions, it would be more

realistic to think of hope in terns of the intermingling of
the elements of each formulation, Man reasons and he
believes, he taakes use of his own abilities to attain goals,
and he often depends on resources external to himself to
attain the same goals.
There is a certain intellectual appeal to the idea
that reasoning, belief, action, and dependency on the
resources of external reality intermingle in the experience
of hope. Whether this always happens in reality or to what
extent it does remains questionable, and there are reasons
that suggest that one form of the experience of hope is more
likely to occur in some situations than others.

6#
Within any one cultural or societal context, the
values of that setting often influence whether a person will
be action-oriented or more passive, whether he will be a
believer or a more reasoning person. Man often finds himself in a position where he is requested to polarize himself, to accept one way of functioning rather than another.
To some extent the environmental conditions will determine
which form of hope he is more likely to experience.

To the

extent that one setting emphasizes the conditions pertaining
to a particular model of hope, itraaylimit the possibility
of experiencing hope where hope is based on the conditions
of an alternate model.
This point may be illustrated in relation to one
discernible trend in North American life. With the reversal
of the man-God polarities in the twentieth century, it is
expected that man will do what tiod was once expected to do.
That is, some see man as having to create ex nihiio, to
improvise value and meaning out of unlimited freedoo (Keen,
1970).

The current values and meaning often flow one way--

from man to the world. Man is often perceived as a giver
and a creator of meaning rather than a recipient. His
actions play a central role in the creation of meaning; they
are viewed as the aeans by which such meaning is attained.
This perspective is sometimes manifested In a cultural emphasis on independent activity:

m
We are often forced by our culture to deny dependence, passivity, the wish and ability to receive.
We do not seem to be able to rest. We have the
greatest difficulty in being passive, in doing
nothing. We are afraid of the gentler eraotions.
We misinterpret the wishes we have in these directions, and the wishes to be received and be loved,
as though the wishes were wrong and had to be suppressed like the plague. As though, according to
our culture . . * there came a point where we are
supposed to be grown up and not have such thoughts;
as though at some initiated age of twenty-one we are
no longer beings who have been created and received
at all; as though we must no longer use help of any
kind [Lynch, 1965, p. 236j.
To the extent that man acts in accordance with this cultural
bias, his experience of hope may be more or less restricted
to those situations where he can perceive himself to be
effective in attaining goals, rather than being able to
depend on resources external to himself,

furthermore* where

he cannot perceive himself as being effective, he nay not foe
able to experience hope.
The possibility of experiencing hope in some situations may well depend on the realization of some of the
limitations of human existence and abdication from pretensions of omnipotence where such attitudes are part of the
cultural background. Where one does not perceive hisiself as
the centre of reality, the world is perceived differently.
It becomes possible to enjoy rather than exploit, to accept
rather than grasp.

Unlike the omnipotent being,roanis

threatened by extremities, and he is sometimes in need of
hope as this attests to a dependence on what lies outside
himself.

fo
Likewise, a cultural emphasis on rationality may
curtail the possibility of experiencing hope in some situations.

This is based on the view that twentieth-century

man's primary modus operandi consists of thought that is
rationalistic, empirical, pragmatic, and operational*

To

the extent that this is man's exclusive orientation, it stay
be impossible for him to acknowledge anything that transcends the categories of established experience.

It aay be

impossible for him to hope where hope Is based on belief.
This is what Marcel (1965) understood when he stated that a
cold blooded approach to reality leads neither to hope nor
despair.
The need to control the realm of possibility raay be
viewed as an additional factor that limits the chance of
experiencing hope.

It seems to have become increasingly

necessary to adopt every means to eliminate possibility.
Many want reasons, proof, and certitude in the form of perfect predictability before they will take any hope seriously
(FronBa* 1968).
This eosMaentary is not meant to deny the importance
and value of self-initiated and independent forms of activity or processes of reasoning as these may lead to hopeful
expectations.

It is only ueant to point out that action and

reasoning may not always be a sufficient basis for hope, and
to the extent that these ways of behaving are adopted as an
exclusive reality, they may curtail the possibility of
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experiencing hope in some situations.
There are also many situations in our culture which
involve dependent forms of relationship and believing without reasons, and where these ways of behaving are overemphasized, there is likely to be an absence of hope based
on action or reason.

Beliefs would reduce the chances of

experiencing hope particularly in situations where the
beliefs are antithetical to hope or where the content of a
belief discourages man fro® acting or reasoning.

Further-

more, it is often more realistic that man act in his own
behalf, and to do so would be a more valued form of activity.
A more dependent orientation would reduce this possibility.
It is obvious that man has complex needs and desires,
and it can be said that he sometimes has hope that his needs
will be fulfilled and his desires realized.

At this stage

in his evolution, one of his most important hopes may well
be that he grow in insight to understand which model of hope
is more valuable and appropriate for both himself a^nd others
at any one time and place. We may also hope that he will
have the courage to act and reason if these activities are
needed, and depend on others and believe in the 'possible*
in situations that are clearly beyond his ability to influence.
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